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Launched in 2009, Aadhaar – also known as the Unique Identification Scheme – is one 
India's latest large-scale poor-poor initiatives. With the goal of providing all of the 
country's residents with unique, biometric-based identification numbers, Aadhaar is a 
particularly ambitious project, which has been depicted by the Indian government as a 
transformative step that will enable the poor and marginalized to access public services 
and welfare entitlements. At the same time, Aadhaar has also attracted a fair amount of 
public critique, pivoting around what is seen as the scheme's potential for state 
monitoring and surveillance. This essay is an attempt to move beyond the normative 
polar opposition that composes the public debate on Aadhaar. Instead, it seeks to place 
this extensive government project within the framework of dreams about the state and its 
relations with citizens. Aadhaar, it is argued here, rests on an ideological formation that 
combines utopian, technological, and neoliberal notions about state and society. On a 
symbolic level, the scheme expresses a desire for responsive disintermediation in state-
society relations, to be achieved specifically through a reformation of government 
ventures in the image of an entrepreneurial information technology start-up. This essay 
thus provides an analysis of Aadhaar as a state hi-tech fantasy, which can offer an 
insight into the (post-)neoliberal Indian state. 
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A historic step 
n September 2010, Tembhli, a remote 
tribal hamlet in the Indian state of 
Maharashtra, earned “a special 
importance in the map of India,” it was 
declared by Sonia Gandhi, president of the 
ruling Congress Party (quoted in Byatnal 
2010). Ten of Tembhli’s inhabitants became 
the first Indians to receive a Unique 
Identification (UID) number, as the 
government’s novel UID scheme was launched 
in the small village, marking – to quote Mrs. 
Gandhi again – “a historic step towards 
strengthening the people of our nation” (ibid.). 
India's ambitious UID project began taking 
shape in 2009 with the establishment of the 
Unique Identification Authority of India 
(UIDAI) (UIDAI  2010c), a governmental 
agency with the mandate to issue every Indian 
resident a 12-digit identification number that is 
linked to unique personal biometric markers 
such as fingerprints and iris scans (UIDAI 
2010a). With nearly 630 million enrolled so 
far, every second Indian already has a UID 
number, and 1.2 million new numbers are 
being generated every day (Economic Times 
2014). 
While various versions of biometric 
identification systems and databases have 
already been introduced in different parts of the 
world (fingerprinted passports in several EU 
countries or the United States Visitor and 
Immigrant Status Indicator Technology known 
as USVISIT, for instance), India’s UID scheme 
is the first ever to be taken on such a massive 
scale (UIDAI 2010a; Rai 2012). According to 
UIDAI officials, with its current coverage the 
scheme already surpasses any other biometric 
database in the world (Kurup 2012).  
It is not only in scope, however, that the 
Indian venture is unique; perhaps more 
significantly, it is also distinct in its 
conceptualization. Whereas most governments 
have been formulating discussions about 
technologically advanced identification 
measures in terms of national security 
(Maringanti 2009), India's UID project is 
couched in purely developmentalist terms. The 
scheme is depicted by UIDAI and the 
Government of India as a means to realize “a 
larger vision of inclusion and development . . .” 
(UIDAI  2010c), resonating with the 
transnational language of inclusive growth and 
more specifically ICT4D (Information and 
Communication Technology for 
Development). Aadhaar’s main focus, we are 
told, is on the poor and marginalized (UIDAI 
2010a), whose inability to provide proof of 
identity is a major barrier preventing them 
from accessing public facilities and services, 
participating in the modern economy, and 
receiving state welfare benefits (UIDAI  
2010c).  
With no birth certificate, passport, driving 
license, or proof of address, the argument goes, 
I 
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most of the poor have no possibility of opening 
a bank account or availing of markets to sell 
their goods (Nilekani 2010b), and surely “no 
one would be so foolish as to lend them 
money” (Economist 2012). Moreover, while 
the Indian government operates large welfare 
schemes such as the Public Distribution 
System (PDS) and the National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), 
providing subsidized food grains and 
guaranteed wage employment to the poor 
respectively, indigents’ lack of an ‘official’ 
identity means that they “struggle to lay hands 
on what they have been promised” (ibid.). An 
estimated two-thirds of the food items 
delivered through the PDS are reportedly 
stolen or siphoned by middlemen (ibid.; 
McGivering 2011), and a large share of the 
funds provided through the NREGS are 
embezzled using fake job cards of ‘ghost 
workers’ or forged attendance sheets 
(Bhattacharya 2011; Drèze & Khera 2008).  
It is this kind of problems, besetting 
India’s public welfare and social protection 
system, that the UID scheme is argued to 
address, and this by removing the ‘identity 
obstacle’: the UID number effectively gives its 
holder an “identity with respect to the state” 
(Nilekani 2010b). Such an identity will allow 
the poor, first of all, to access public services 
(banking is a commonly cited example); and 
second, to securely receive the social benefits 
they are entitled to. Moreover, the UID scheme 
is claimed to enable national welfare 
programmes such as the PDS and NREGS – 
for whose delivery the new authentication 
system was envisioned to be utilized from the 
very start (UIDAI n.d.[a], n.d.[b]) – to include 
population segments hitherto cut off from 
them, become more transparent, and actually 
reach the right individuals (Nilekani 2010a, 
2010b). (And so, while enrollment in the UID 
scheme is not compulsory, service and welfare 
delivery is likely to become increasingly 
dependent on it.1) 
A single and universal identification 
system, UIDAI says, will be “transformational 
in eliminating . . . duplicate identities” across 
welfare programmes, and in eradicating the 
prevalent fraud and pilferage of benefits that 
have become associated with them 
(Government of India 2011: 78; Nilekani 
2010a). Just imagine: grain would be delivered 
“not to poor people in general but to named 
individuals who could confirm receipt by 
scanning their fingerprints,” and ghost workers 
would have to “undergo an iris scan before 
being paid” (Economist 2012). Giving the final 
seal to its inclusive, pro-poor vision, the UID 
scheme has since its inception been renamed 
                                                 
1 For example, 50 districts nationwide have been 
selected for a pilot project in which the distribution of 
PDS grains is linked with the UID system: ration shops 
provide the food items to beneficiaries by taking their 
fingerprints and accessing their UID data (Sankar 2012). 
In the NREGS, although payment to workers should 
currently not depend on the possession of a UID card, it 
was reported that labourers without UID cards had been 
denied wages (Hindu 2014).  
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Aadhaar, which in Hindi means ‘support.’ Its 
launch in the bucolic village of Tembhli was 
also a statement of purpose about the people 
that Aadhaar “hopes to benefit the most” 
(UIDAI 2010b). 
Yet it was not long before other voices 
began to surface, lambasting the new shiny 
government initiative – in a manner not 
unfamiliar from critiques hurled at other 
national biometric identity projects – as a 
project of state surveillance and monitoring. 
Aadhaar, according to its critics, emerged not 
from ideas about welfare and inclusion, but 
from security concerns and warnings about 
India’s inadequate surveilling capability 
(Ramakumar 2009, 2010). In this vein, the 
opposition argues, the digitized collection and 
convergence of vast amounts of personal and 
biometric data that Aadhaar facilitates will be 
an instrument for profiling, tracking and tailing 
of denizens by the state and its agents (Bidawi 
2010; Gupta 2010; Ramanathan 2010a; 
Ramanathan 2010b; Sandilya et al. 2010). 
Aadhaar, in short, will serve as the basis for a 
new surveillance regime. As colourfully 
depicted by Jean Drèze, the eminent 
naturalized Indian economist, in an opinion 
piece published in the Hindu: 
It is quite likely that a few weeks from 
now someone will be knocking at your 
doors and asking for your fingerprints. If 
you agree, your fingerprints will enter a 
national database, along with personal 
characteristics (age, sex, occupation, and 
so on) that have already been collected 
from you [emphasis in original], unless 
you were missed in the ‘Census 
Household Listing’ earlier this year. The 
purpose of this exercise is to build the 
National Population Register (NPR). In 
due course, your UID (Unique Identity 
Number, or “Aadhaar”) will be added to 
it. This will make it possible to link the 
NPR with other Aadhaar-enabled 
databases, from tax returns to bank 
records and SIM (subscriber identity 
module) registers. This includes the 
Home Ministry's National Intelligence 
Grid (NATGRID), smoothly linking 21 
national databases. For the intelligence 
agencies, this will be a dream-come-true. 
Imagine, everyone's fingerprints at the 
click of a mouse, that too with 
demographic information and all the rest. 
Should any suspicious person book a 
flight, or use a cybercafé, or any of the 
services that will soon require an 
Aadhaar number, she will be on their 
radar. If, say, Arundhati Roy makes 
another trip to Dantewada,2 she will be 
picked up on arrival like a ripe plum. 
Fantastic! (Drèze 2010) 
Aadhaar, then, certainly sparked a lively 
public debate, carried out with considerable 
animation over both the pages and e-pages of 
newspapers, journals and blogs3, and consisting 
of two main antithetical images. On one side, 
as promulgated by Aadhaar’s architects and 
supporters, we have the benevolent state, 
which initiates a gargantuan project first and 
foremost to facilitate social inclusion in access 
to public and welfare services, and rid the latter
                                                 
2 In 2010, the writer-activist travelled to the district to 
meet with and interview outlawed Maoist groups (Roy 
2010). 
3 The aforementioned Hindu, the influential Economic 
and Political Weekly, and the blog Say No to Aadhaar 
(saynotoaadhaar.blogsopt.com) – to name just a few. 
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of the endemic corruption that has come to 
plague it. There is, as Ramanathan notes 
(2010b: 10), an unequivocal benignancy that is 
attributed to the scheme by its leaders. The 
official rhetoric of Aadhaar depicts an image of 
an Indian state that is caring and protective, 
one that veers toward restoring some of the 
notion of the developmental welfarism which 
was, as Corbridge and Harris (2000: 169) and 
others have shown, so critically eroded during 
the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s. Take, for 
example, the response of UIDAI’s director 
general, R. S. Sharma, to an article in 
Economic and Political Weekly (Ramanathan 
2010b) that critiqued Aadhaar’s oppressive 
potential. That article’s author “would do well 
to acknowledge,” Mr. Sharma writes,  
. . . that it is the government which 
spends on the delivery of social benefits 
such as food, health, education and 
work, and the government is 
consequently keen to ensure that these 
benefits actually reach the people they 
are intended for. This is the animating 
principle behind Aadhaar. Without 
building better and more secure social 
welfare nets, and ensuring access for the 
poor to education and health, our efforts 
against inequality and poverty will come 
to naught. Aadhaar is the foundation on 
which we can provide the services and 
resources individuals need to ensure 
their dignity, and their right to a better 
life. (Sharma 2010: 103) 
In stark opposition, on the other side of the 
Aadhaar debate pendulum – the one put 
forward by the project’s main detractors – a 
very different picture is drawn. Here we have 
the sinister state, whose new flagship scheme is 
actually about creating an “infrastructure of 
authoritarianism” (Drèze 2010) and exerting 
“social and executive control of the people” 
(Ramanathan 2010b) through novel capacities 
to surveil, monitor, track and profile. Here, the 
state does not attentively work on behalf of the 
masses, but treats them as potential suspects 
that need to be trailed; its main concern is not 
with ensuring welfare, but with policing and 
controlling. 
My aim in this essay is to move beyond 
the normative polar opposition that dominates 
the public debate on Aadhaar. Instead, my 
intention is to take the discussion on Aadhaar 
to another level of analysis, where the scheme 
can be read as an expression of certain 
underlying notions about the state and its 
interactions with citizens in post-liberalization 
India. I argue that on an ideological-symbolic 
level, Aadhaar – similarly to its spiritual father, 
the idea of e-governance – is a symptomatic 
manifestation of two interconnected desires. 
The first is for state-citizen relations that are 
transparent and immediate; the second is for 
the employment of the knowledge economy as 
a basis for these relations, whereby state 
ventures (such as Aadhaar) are envisaged in the 
form of a hi-tech start-up. I explore and explain 
these two desires, and their relation to Aadhaar, 
in the essay’s following two sections. What I 
wish to do overall, then, is place Aadhaar
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within the context of a dream about transparent 
visibility in state-society interactions, which is 
specifically enabled by bringing 
entrepreneurial, information technology and 
private sector notions into the domain of state 
and society. What I argue, in other words, is 
that Aadhaar is, in essence, a state hi-tech 
fantasy. 
 
Disintermediation 
“'Anytime, anywhere, anyhow' authentication” 
(UIDAI n.d.[c]), Aadhaar's unofficial tagline 
reads, giving expression to what the scheme is 
most fundamentally trying to achieve: making 
citizens, through their personal Aadhaar 
numbers, ubiquitously recognizable to the 
state. By extension, this reciprocally applies to 
the state as well: what Aadhaar symbolically 
marks is not only the transparently viewable 
citizen for the state, but also an always-visible, 
transparent presence of the state for the citizen. 
What's more, this kind of presence also implies 
directness. Corbridge et al. describe how 
technology is envisioned as “one means for 
bringing the citizen and the state into a 
supposedly unmediated encounter that offers 
each party an undistorted sighting of the other” 
(2005: 44). Technology, in other words, is 
frequently thought of as an (anti-political) 
force that is able to penetrate the layers of 
mediation that come between the state and the 
citizen in their interactions – layers inhabited 
by the various middlemen, intermediaries, 
brokers, fixers, and even politicians who, with 
their concealed motives and plays of power, 
encumber the relations between state and 
society, and blemish their representations of 
one another.4 Such a view of technology is 
above all apparent in the discourse of e-
governance.  
The attempt to bring technology into 
government operations is often traced back to 
the 1980s and then prime minister Rajiv 
Gandhi, who gained the nickname 
“Computerji” thanks to his prominent habit of 
bringing his laptop and using it in meetings 
(Mazzarella 2006: 482; Nilekani 2009). Yet 
despite Mr. Gandhi’s early (and rather isolated) 
attempts to ignite a very preliminary form of 
‘g-governance,’ it was not until the new 
millennium that, following the flourishing 
Indian information technology industry, more 
and more calls arose for the employment of 
this kind of technology in government, and 
specifically in public service delivery. One of 
the most prominent voices was Nandan 
Nilekani, then a highly successful hi-tech 
entrepreneur who now happens to be the 
chairman of UIDAI. A considerable portion of 
Nilekani’s 2009 book Imagining India: The 
Idea of a Renewed Nation, in which he lays out 
his visionary outlook for the country, is 
                                                 
4 In the literature, these people are often described as 
blurring the boundary between state and society (see for 
example Gupta 1998, 2005).  
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dedicated to what he sees as the transformative 
potential of incorporating information 
technology in Indian governance. For Nilekani, 
it is there that technology can most usefully be 
leveraged, and help to determine the “kind of 
society” India will be (Nilekani 2008: 349, 
2009). I come back to the figure of Nilekani 
below.  
Since the early 2000s, projects of e-
governance – broadly defined as the use of 
information technology “in the public sector to 
improve its operations and delivery of 
services” (Kumar and Best 2006: 1) – have 
been gaining significant momentum. One of 
the first, a project called Sustainable Access in 
Rural India (SARI) that started in 2000, 
involved setting up electronic portals in 
villages for the online provision of a variety of 
government services such as issuing caste 
certificates and lodging grievances (ibid.: 2-3). 
Such computerization of people's interactions 
with government, it was believed, "will in the 
long run cut red tape, make the government-
citizen relationship more friendly, and 
ultimately reduce the corruption that has eaten 
into the vitals of the country" (Akhileshwari 
quoted in Mazzarella 2006: 481).  
Under India's National e-Governance Plan, 
launched in 2006, more than 130,000 similar 
rural terminals have so far been installed. 
These information technology-enabled "front 
end service delivery points”, known as 
Common Service Centres, are part of the aim 
“to introduce e-governance on a massive scale” 
and make the delivery of government services 
“accessible to the common man in his locality” 
(Government of India n.d.[a], n.d.[b]). 
Covering over 600,000 villages, the network of 
Common Service Centres is according to the 
Indian government the world's largest state-
initiated, web-based public service system 
(Government of India n.d.[c]).   
Indeed, enthusiasm about e-governance 
(and more broadly ICT4D) has been on the 
rise, not only in India. Considerable funding 
has been injected into ICT4D programmes 
around the world, and far-reaching projects are 
in development5. The World Bank, for 
instance, in 2010 launched its e-Transform 
Initiative, which supports developing countries 
in applying information technology to 
“transform public service delivery” (World 
Bank 2010). Aadhaar, for its part, is a central 
component of India's National e-Governance 
Plan, and indubitably its largest and most 
ambitious project. As such, it has been 
heralded, in the words of Sonia Ghandi, to 
finally bring into realization “Rajiv Gandhi’s 
faith that information and technology could be 
used to make lives better” (quoted in Byatnal 
2010).  
But the appeal of e-governance, I argue 
following William Mazzarella (2006), goes 
                                                 
5 In construction, for example, is a fully electronically 
governed city, where all administrative transactions with 
residents are to be conducted via electronic devices 
installed in apartments (Saini 2011). 
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deeper than buoyant promises to ameliorate 
lives and reengineer development endeavours. 
As an ideological formation, Mazzarella 
suggests, the idea of e-governance is on a 
fundamental level animated by a “frictionless 
ideal of disintermediation” (Mazzarella 2006: 
496). Extending from this ideal is a utopian 
dream – of which I take Aadhaar to be one 
chief manifestation – in which the relationship 
between state and society is transparent, 
immediate and unmediated, whereby 
government and citizen communicate, interact 
and respond to each other directly, freed of the 
mediating entities that so often hurdle their 
communication. Not less importantly, the idea 
of disintermediation also carries with it a sense 
of an understanding intimacy. The central 
appeal of e-governance, argues Mazzarella, lies 
in its promise to coalesce rational technological 
effectiveness with an “affectively charged ideal 
of communicative immediacy” (ibid.: 481). In 
the e-polity, he notes, government and citizen 
would respond to each other not only with 
"minimal mediation," but also “exquisite 
sensitivity,” conveyed  through e-governance’s 
“claim to represent a more caring and more 
locally embedded principle of social inclusion” 
(ibid.: 485).  
Aadhaar, then, seems to me to be placed at 
the centre of a dream of technocratic 
optimization of governance that is nonetheless 
not rendered coldly affectless by its level-
headed rationality, but is rather the foundation 
for a relationship between the state and its 
citizens that is not only transparent and 
immediate, but also empathisingly responsive 
and attending. The personal Aadhaar number is 
here a symbolic token of participation in this 
relationship. Already with e-governance, the 
"provision of a channel of expression, 
irrespective of actual government response or 
action, was in itself a therapeutic gesture" 
(ibid.: 486). Aadhaar now takes this one step 
further, and with much greater figurative force: 
the unique numerical identity it provides to 
every citizen serves as their universally valid 
access ticket to the state; a personal, 
biometrically custom-made gift from the state 
to its denizens, reaffirming its approachability.  
Interestingly, however, while the dream 
behind Aadhaar speaks the language of 
affective politics and invokes (like e-
governance) an appeal to direct democracy, it 
at the same time relies on an appeal to 
economic market principles. In what follows, I 
try to show how in the fantasy underlying 
Aadhaar, the transformation in the relationship 
between government and citizens is enabled 
specifically through an importation of the 
neoliberal notion of a knowledge economy into 
the sphere of state-society relations. 
 
Governtrepreneur 
Transparency, that utopian figure that is with 
Aadhaar applied to state-society relations, is 
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also a quality that is often brought up in 
relation to markets in neoclassical economic 
thought: the idea that in the ideal market 
sphere, 'much is known by many', that 
information (financial or trade) is readily 
available, that capital is visible. In the literature 
on the instruments of contemporary capitalism, 
however, scholars such as LiPuma & Lee 
(2004) and Mitchell (2007) have allowed us to 
see how 'transparency' is in fact part of a 
market myth, a (mis)representation that 
produces an illusion of regularity, rationality, 
efficiency, and prosperity. LiPuma & Lee, in 
their analysis of financial derivatives, debunk 
the economistic assumption that the market can 
accurately quantify and 'price' risk, which rests 
inter alia on a notion of a transparent 
marketplace, in which financial risk can be 
objectively predicted, measured, and acted 
upon (2004). Mitchell, in his discussion of  
formal and informal economic arrangements, 
challenges the persistent distinction between an 
'inside' and 'outside' of the capitalist market, 
which relies on the idea that within the 
boundaries of the market – unlike in informal, 
nonmarket arrangements – wealth and assets 
are visible, and therefore formal, 'live' (in 
Hernando de Soto's term), and productive 
(2007).  
My point here is that it would seem that 
the same fantasy of transparent visibility that is 
assigned with Aadhaar to state-society relations 
is also part of the aura of the entity that is the 
market. And indeed, as this ideological link 
may imply, Aadhaar is certainly also rooted in 
an essentially economic market logic. This 
becomes evident from the scheme's consumer-
oriented discourse of choice – a catchword 
fundamental to current consumerism (Miller 
1994). 
Just like in the marketplace, chairman of 
UIDAI Nandan Nilekani tells us, Aadhaar will 
finally enable people to choose when it comes 
public service providers (Nilekani 2010b). 
Through offering a "mobile identity, with 
mobile rights and entitlements” (Nilekani 
2010a.), Aadhaar means that one will no longer 
be confined to the local provider of services – 
no more obtaining food grains only from the 
single, corrupt PDS ration shop in the village, 
or sending your child to the only nearby, 
underperforming public school. Instead, people 
will be given the appealingly potent possibility 
of choice – "a choice that essentially transfers 
the negotiating power from the supplier to the 
customer" (Nilekani 2010b).  
In fact, the Indian discourse of e-
governance is in large part about the 
"consumerist-populist notion of empowerment" 
(Mazzarella 1996: 481), and a statement such 
as Nilekani's has to be read in the context of a 
broader process of reconstruction of state-
society encounters, in which, in private sector 
semantics, citizens come to be regarded as 
clients of the state (Corbridge et al. 2005). And 
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if citizens are clients, then the state – as is 
already suggested from the neoliberal concept 
of 'governance' and its focus on the 
administrative and managerial – should, simply 
put, function like a company. Indeed, that 
government should be run like a business has 
become an increasingly used trope, recently 
argued for by Microsoft co-founder Bill Gates, 
former eBay CEO Meg Whitman in her run for 
governor in California, former CEO-turned-
governor Rick Scott, and presidential candidate 
Mitt Romney in his 2012 campaign 
(Bloomfield 2013). And while such a notion in 
itself may by now not sound unfamiliar, what 
Aadhaar does add to the story is that it gives 
this 'company' a distinct form: the 
entrepreneurial hi-tech start-up. 
As part of "a wave of good governance 
reforms in developing countries", public-
private partnerships have been increasingly 
used for the delivery of hitherto government-
provided services (Kuriyan and Ray 2009). 
This is especially the case with the 
implementation of ICT4D projects, where 
computer kiosks or telecentres providing 
government services in rural regions are 
progressively privately-run. Such telecentres, 
Kuriyan and Ray (2009) suggest, delivering 
public services but managed by micro-
entrepreneurs, are associated with the private 
sector and therefore with efficiency and 
responsiveness, contrary to government 
services' reputation of lethargic sluggishness 
and poor quality.  
Indeed, the arguments for delivering 
ICT4D services through public-private 
partnerships go back to the idea of the citizen-
customer. With their emphasis on customer 
satisfaction, it has been argued, the private 
sector has in effect established a yardstick for 
government services and their evaluation by 
citizens (Mazzarella 2006: 484). The 
proponents of public-private partnerships stress 
the importance of treating the citizen as a 
customer, as opposed to a recipient of handouts 
from government representatives inattentive to 
citizens' needs (Corbridge et al.; Kuriyan and 
Ray 2009). The Indian government, too, has 
adopted entrepreneur-owned telecentres as a 
key element in its e-governance reform 
(Kuriyan and Ray 2009). The Common Service 
Centres programme under India's National e-
Governance Plan is being implemented through 
a public-private partnership, whereby these 
information technology-enabled kiosks are 
being "operated and managed by Village Level 
Entrepreneurs" (Government of India n.d.[b]). 
Ultimately, Kurivan and Ray (2009) argue, the 
partnering with and outsourcing of this form of 
service delivery to private entities provide the 
state with a way to upgrade its image before its 
citizens – and more broadly to renegotiate its 
relations with them.  
Aadhaar, I would suggest, takes this 
agenda one step further: here, the refashioning 
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of state image and relations with society is 
taking place not through the outsourcing of the 
state to micro entrepreneurs, but through in-
sourcing large-scale information technology 
entrepreneurship into the state itself. This shift 
is neatly emblemized in the figure that was 
chosen by the Indian government to lead 
Aadhaar,6 already briefly introduced earlier. 
“The Bill Gates of Bangalore”, as he was 
described in the Guardian (Roberts 2009), and 
former Forbes' Business Man of the Year, 
Nandan Nilekani is one India's biggest 
software entrepreneurial moguls. As the 
founder of Infosys Limited, a provider of 
information technology-enabled solutions and 
one of India’s largest multinational companies, 
Nilekani has been a foremost icon of the Indian 
information technology boom.  
Superlatively combining a zest for 
technology with a spirit of entrepreneurship, 
Nilekani is also a man with sturdy opinions 
about the benefits of information technology in 
government, as well as about the advantages of 
the private sector over the public one in terms 
of “efficiency, accountability and initiative” 
(Nilekani 2008: 36). Nilekani's ideas on these 
issues make up a large portion of his 
abovementioned book, in which lays out his 
information technology-oriented vision for a 
                                                 
6 Since being appointed chairman of UIDAI, Nilekani 
has also been selected to head the Indian government's 
Technology Advisory Group for Unique Projects 
(TAGUP), advising the regime on ICT initiatives in 
areas such as treasury management, tax, and pension 
(Hindu 2010). 
future India. Like other Indian political pinups 
of the recent period, Nilekani positively 
encourages his identification “not with the 
political, historical, or mythological heroes of 
the national imaginary but, rather, with 
contemporary corporate colossi” (Mazzarella 
2006: 483) – and yet more specifically with the 
hi-tech industry. With Nilekani in charge, then, 
Aadhaar doesn't simply denote the return of the 
technocrat, or even the further rise of the 
“laptop politician” (ibid.: 495). Rather, what 
Aadhaar seems to indicate is the emergence of 
a novel figure in this chain, namely – to borrow 
the title of a Forbes article on Nilekani 
(Jayashankar 2010) – the hi-tech 
governtrepreneur. And so, in the dream of 
affectionate transparency that is driving 
Aadhaar, the responsiveness of the state is 
marked by not only state-citizen 
disintermediation, but also by the inventive 
efficacy and customer courtesy linked with the 
private, entrepreneurial, information 
technology sector – in other words, by an 
idealized representation of a major state 
venture as an innovative, efficient, and service-
oriented hi-tech start-up. 
What such an idea of the state implies is 
the final entering of the knowledge economy – 
the development and application of knowledge-
intensive technologies in the market economy 
(see for example Castells and Hall 2000) – into 
the distinct domain of government and state-
society relations. In the social sciences, the 
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concept of the knowledge economy has been 
used mostly to study current forms of 
capitalism and new economic phenomena in 
the private sector, for example the software 
outsourcing industry (Upadhya 2009) or 
science parks (Massey et al. 1992). And so, 
while the state has not been entirely absent 
from the discussion, the analysis of the 
knowledge economy has largely not taken 
place with regard to the concept of the state 
itself, as would seem to follow from a 
government initiative like Aadhaar. In their 
critical study of hi-tech parks, which became 
established in increasing numbers in the United 
Kingdom (and elsewhere) during the 1980s, 
Massey et al. (1992) do move in the direction 
of such a theorization when placing the 
knowledge economy within the Thatcherite 
(say neoliberal) project and its vision of the 
future of production and work.  
Such an observation is certainly valuable 
in prompting us to see how Aadhaar, while 
ostensibly representing an immense 'social' 
investment from the side of the state, is also in 
fact very much embedded within neoliberal 
ideas of market-driven strategies and private 
sector-oriented models as the basis for 
effective development. But even Massey et al., 
like others who have written about the 
knowledge economy, could not have predicted 
that the state itself would come to envisage 
government ventures as knowledge economy 
start-ups, and its relation with citizens as based 
on such an economy. It is here that Aadhaar 
allows linking the discussion on the knowledge 
economy – hitherto largely limited to the 
context of the market and the workplace – to 
that on the workings and (self-)image of the 
neoliberal state. The idea of a flagship 
government scheme as an entrepreneurial hi-
tech entity, providing better and more attentive 
services to its citizens-customers, is central to 
the symbolic concept of the state that is 
projected through Aadhaar, and to the dream of 
reconstituted state-society relations that 
underlies it.  
 
An emerging state 
Since liberalization, write Gupta and 
Sivaramakrishnan, “. . . more has been written 
about the decline of the [Indian] developmental 
state than about the state that is emerging in its 
place” (Gupta and Sivaramakrishnan 2010: 3). 
In a sense, the kind of analysis of Aadhaar that 
I have pursued here could contribute to 
shedding some light on precisely this emerging 
state. My intention in this essay has been to 
push the discussion on Aadhaar beyond both 
the inclusive pro-poor and panoptic Big 
Brother discourses that have comprised the 
public debate on Aadhaar, and show that on an 
ideological level, this flagship national project 
may be illustrative of something quite different 
than a turn toward either reinvigorated 
welfarism or authoritarianism. Instead, I have 
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argued that Aadhaar has to be seen within the 
framework of dreams about state and society. 
While epitomizing and pushing forward both 
the ideal of disintermediation and the “market-
molded managerial ethos” that are captured in 
the idea of e-governance (Mazzarella 2006: 
499), Aadhaar is animated by a fantasy of 
ubiquitous visibility of state and citizen in 
relation to each other, which in turn rests on an 
(essentially neoliberal) envisagement of the 
relationship between them as part of hi-tech-
oriented knowledge economy. On this level of 
analysis, then, Aadhaar is part of a fantasy 
about a reconfiguration of state-society 
relations, through a reshaping of the conceptual 
form and practice of the state. Approached this 
way, I believe Aadhaar can provide us with an 
insight into the ideological design of the 
contemporary Indian state – and more broadly 
contribute to our understanding of the post-
neoliberal state – by pointing to some of the 
dreams that underscore it, and which translate 
into novel and distinctive forms of government 
development projects.
 www.southasianist.ed.ac.uk   |   ISSN 2050-487X   |   pg. 116 
References Cited 
Bhattacharya, D. P. (2011), 'Massive corruption 
hits NREGA implementation”, Express 
India, February 11 [accessed on 12 
December 2013 at: 
www.expressindia.com/latestnews/massive
-corruption-
hitsnregaimplementation/271528/] 
Bidawi, P. (2010), 'The Perils of Aadhaar', 
Daily Star, October 4 [accessed on 15 
December 2013 at: 
www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-
details.php?nid=156998] 
Bloomfield, A. (2013), 'Bill Gates Says 
Government Should Be Run More Like a 
Business: Why That's a Bad Idea.” 
PolicyMic, March 14 [accessed on 17 
December 2013 at: 
www.policymic.com/articles/29749/bill-
gates-says-government-should-be-
runmore- like-a-business-why-that-s-a-
badidea] 
Byatnal, A. (2010), 'Tembhli Becomes First 
Aadhar Village in India,' Hindu, 
September 29 [accessed on 15 December 
2013 at: 
www.thehindu.com/news/national/article8
02538.ece] 
Castells, M. and P. Hall. 1993. Technopoles of 
the World: The Making of 21st-Century 
Industrial Complexes, London, New York: 
Routledge. 
Corbridge, S. and J. Harriss. (2000), 
Reinventing India: Liberalization, Hindu 
Nationalism and Popular Democracy, 
Cambridge, UK: Polity. 
Corbridge, S., G. Williams, M. Srivastava and 
R. Véron. (2005), Seeing the State: 
Governance and Governmentality in India, 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Drèze, J. (2010), 'Unique Facility, or Recipe to 
Trouble?', Hindu, November 25 [accessed 
on 15 December 2013 at: 
www.hindu.com/2010/11/25/stories/20101
12563151300.htm] 
Drèze, J. and R. Khera. (2008), 'From Accounts 
to Accountability', Hindu, December 6 
[accessed on 17 December 2013 at: 
www.indu.com/2008/12/06/stories/200812
0656391100.htm] 
Economic Times. (2014), 'Every second Indian 
now has Aadhaar number', March 11 
[accessed on 16 May 2014 at: 
articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/201
4-03-
11/news/48118153_1_aadhaarproject-uid-
project-nilekani] 
Economist. (2012), 'The magic number', 
January 14 [accessed on 16 December at: 
www.economist.com/node/21542763] 
Government of India. (n.d.)a, ‘Common 
Service Centres’ [accessed on 18 May 
2014 at: 
deity.gov.in/content/commonservices-
centers] 
_________________. (n.d.)b, ‘About Common 
Services Centres Scheme’ [accessed 18 
May at: csc.gov.in/] 
_________________. (n.d.)c, ‘National e-
Governance Plan’ [accessed on 18 May at: 
india.gov.in/e-governance/national-e-
governance-plan] 
_________________. (2008), '11th Report. 
Promoting e-Governance' [accessed on 20 
December 2013 at: 
arc.gov.in/11threp/ARC_11th_report.htm] 
_________________. (2011), 'A Compendium 
of Mission Mode Projects under NeGP', 
[accessed on 17 December 2013 at: 
indiagovernance.gov.in/files/Compendium
_NEGP.pdf] 
Gupta, A. (1998), Postcolonial Developments: 
Agriculture in the Making of Modern 
India. Durham, N.C.: Duke University 
Press.  
________. (2005), 'Narratives of Corruption: 
Anthropological and Fictional Accounts of 
the Indian State,' Ethnography 6 (1): 5-34. 
www.southasianist.ed.ac.uk   |   ISSN 2050-487X   |   pg. 117 
Gupta, A. and K. Sivaramakrishnan. (2010), 
'Introduction: The State in India After 
Liberalization', in Gupta, A. and K. 
Sivaramakrishnan (eds.), The State in India 
after Liberalization. Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives, London: Routledge: 1-28. 
Hindu. (2010), 'Finance Ministry sets up 
technology advisory group', June 7 
[accessed on 15 December 2013 at: 
www.thehindu.com/news/national/finance-
ministry-sets-up-technologyadvisory-
group/article449063.ece] 
Hindu. (2014), 'Payment denied for NREGA 
workers without UIDAI cards in 
Jharkhand', February 11 [accessed on 16 
May 2014 at: 
www.thehindu.com/news/national/paymen
t-denied-for-nrega-workers-without-
uidaicards-in-
jharkhand/article5674969.ece] 
Jayashankar, M. (2010), 'Nandan Nilekani: 
Governtrepreneur', Forbes, January 8 
[accessed on 20 December 2013 at: 
www.forbes.com/2010/01/07/forbesindia-
nandan-nilekanigoverntrepreneur.html] 
Kumar, R. and M. L. Best. (2006), 'Impact and 
Sustainability of E-Government Services 
in Developing Countries: Lessons Learned 
from Tamil Nadu, India', The Information 
Society 22: 1-12 
Kuriyan, R. and I. Ray. (2009), 'Outsourcing 
the State? Public-Private Partnerships and 
Information Technologies in India', World 
Development 37 (10): 1663-1673. 
Kurup, D. (2012), 'Spawning identities in 
packets', Hindu, January 29 [accessed on 
29 December 2013 at: 
www.thehindu.com/scitech/technology/arti
cle2840496.ece] 
LiPuma, E. and B. Lee. (2004), 'The World of 
Risk', in LiPuma, E. and B. Lee (eds.), 
Financial Derivatives and the 
Globalisation of Risk, Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press: 141-160 
Maringanti, A. (2009), 'Sovereign State and 
Mobile Subjects: Politics of the UIDAI', 
Economic and Political Weekly 44 (46): 
35-40. 
Massey, D.B., P. Quintas and D. Wield. (1992), 
Hi-Tech Fantasies: Science Parks in 
Society, Science and Space. 
London:Routledge. 
Mazzarella, W. (2006), 'Internet X-Ray: E-
Governance, Transparency, and the 
Politics of Immediation in India,' Public 
Culture 18 (3): 473-505. 
McGivering, J. (2011), 'India Aid Programme 
"Beset by Corruption" – World Bank', 
BBC News, May 18 [accessed on 17 
December 13 at: 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-southasia-
13447867] 
Miller, D. (1994), 'Consumption as the 
Vanguard of History. A Polemic by Way 
of an Introduction', in Miller D. (ed.), 
Acknowledging Consumption: A Review of 
New Studies, New York: Routledge: 1-19.  
Mitchell, T. (1999), 'Society, Economy and the 
State Effect', in Steinmetz G. (ed.), 
State/Culture: State-Formation After the 
Cultural Turn, Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press: 76-97  
Nilekani, N. (2008), Imagining India: Ideas for 
the New Century, London: Allen Lane.  
______________. (2009), 'Giving Indians an 
Identity', Times of India, December 29 
[accessed on 22 December 2013 at: 
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Giving-
Indians-an-
identity/articleshow/5379692.cms] 
______________. (2010)a, 'The India Decade: 
How the UID Can Make Growth 
Inclusive', Inclusion, April 23 [accessed on 
27 December 2013 at: 
www.inclusion.in/index.php?Itemid=77&i
d=473&option=com_content&view=articl
e]
 www.southasianist.ed.ac.uk   |   ISSN 2050-487X   |   pg. 118 
______________. (2010)b, 'The Power of 
Identity', Inclusion, April 24, [accessed on 
20 December 2013 at: 
inclusion.in/index.php?option=com_conten
tview=article&id=537] 
Rai, S. (2012), 'Why India’s identity scheme is 
groundbreaking', BBC News India, June 6 
[accessed on 25 December 2013 at: 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asiaindia-
18156858] 
Ramakumar, R. (2009), 'High-cost, High-risk', 
Frontline 26 (16) [accessed on 27 
December 2013 at: 
www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2616/stories/20
090814261604900] 
____________. (2010), 'What the UID 
Conceals', Hindu, October 21 [accessed on 
15 December 2013 at: 
www.thehindu.com/todays-
paper/tpopinion/article839791.ece] 
Ramanathan, U. (2010)b, “A Unique Identity 
Bill.” Economic and Political Weekly 45 
(30): 10-14. 
____________. (2010)a, 'Eyeing IDs', Indian 
Express, 1 May 2010 [accessed on 12 
December 2013 at: 
www.indianexpress.com/news/eyeing-
ids/613701/] 
Roberts, D. (2009), 'Nandan Nilekani: the "Bill 
Gates of Bangalore" with a Social 
Conscience to Match', Guardian, April 24 
[accessed on 12 December 2013 at: 
guardian.co.uk/business/2009/apr/24/nande
n-nilekanitechnology-infosys] 
Roy, A. (2010), 'Walking With The Comrades', 
Outlook, March 29 [accessed on 25 
December 2013 at: 
www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?26473
8-0] 
Saini, A. (2010), '21st Century, Hi-Tech India: 
the Smartest Country on the Planet', 
Guardian, March 6 [accessed on 20 
December 2013 at: 
www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/06/
india-lavasa-computer-technology] 
Sandilya, S., S. Limaye and Thanuja B.M. 
(2010), 'Nilekani’s Faceless Indian Gets 
Prisoner Number', My Ditigal FC, August 
29 [accessed on 12 December 2013 at: 
www.mydigitalfc.com/economy/nilekani's-
faceless-indian-gets-prisonernumber-291] 
Sankar, K.N. Murali. (2012), 'Aadhaar-linked 
PDS: East Godavari shows the way', 
Hindu, September 6 [accessed on 16 May 
2014 at: 
www.thehindu.com/todayspaper/tp-
national/aadhaarlinked-pds-eastgodavari-
shows-theway/article3864157.ece] 
Sharma, R.S. (2010), 'Identity and the UID: A 
Response', Economic and Political Weekly 
45 (35): 101-103. 
UIDAI. (n.d.)a, 'UID and NREG' [accessed on 
5 December 2013 at: 
uidai.gov.in/images/FrontPageUpdates/uid
_and_mgnrega.pdf] 
______. (n.d.)b, 'UID and PDS System' 
[accessed on 17 December 2013 at: 
uidai.gov.in/images/FrontPageUpdates/uid
_and_pds.pdf ] 
______. (n.d.)c, 'Features of the Aadhaar 
Model' [accessed on 27 December 2013 at: 
uidai.gov.in/index.php?option=com_conte
nt&view=article&id=153&Itemid=13] 
______. (2010)a, 'Press Brief for National 
Launch of Unique Identification Numbers 
(Aadhaar)' [accessed on 12 December 
2013 at: 
uidai.gov.in/images/FrontPageUpdates/ 
Press_note_for_launch_final.doc] 
______. (2010)b, 'Press note: National launch 
of the Aadhaar project' [accessed on 17 
December 2013 at: 
uidai.gov.in/images/FrontPageUpdates/pre
ssnotefinal.doc] 
______. (2010)c, 'UIDAI Strategy Overview: 
Creating a Unique Identity Number for 
Every Resident in India' [accessed on 17 
December 2013 at: 
uidai.gov.in/UID_PDF/Front_Page_Article
s/Documents/Strategy_Overveiw-001.pdf]
www.southasianist.ed.ac.uk   |   ISSN 2050-487X   |   pg. 119 
Upadhya, C. (2009), 'Controlling Offshore 
Knowledge Workers: Power and Agency 
in India’s Software Outsourcing Industry', 
New Technology, Work and Employment 
24 (1): 2-18. 
World Bank. (2010), 'Gemalto, IBM, Intel, L1, 
Microsoft, and Pfizer Join Korea in 
Launch of World Bank’s Novel 
eTransform Initiative' [accessed on 12 
December 2013 at: 
web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL
/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22554498~meuP
K:34466~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~the
SitePK:4607,00.html]
 
 
